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Paul Cammack
It is one of the key precepts of the 'political economy of reform' that every crisis is
an  opportunity  to  be  exploited  to  drive  reform  forward.  True  to  form,  the
international organisations and their G-20 allies have used the current crisis to
their advantage. They have greatly reinforced the power of the IMF in particular,
with the intention of tightening further the disciplinary power of capital,  in line
with a project under way for two decades. In this context, proposals to introduce
an unconditional IMF Flexible Credit Line and to democratise the Bretton Woods
institutions are traps for the unwary.  Rather  than empowering the poor in  the
developing world they legitimise and intensify mechanisms that subject them to
closer control and exploitation by capital. The response of the IFIs to the global
crisis – highly successful so far – has taken the form of a carefully staged illusion
dependent  on  the  magician's  art  of  misdirection.  However,  their  own  recent
publications, analysed here, give their secrets away. As a general rule, the more
progressive these proposals for reform seem to be, the more dangerous they are.
Introduction: 'IMF is back!'
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the IMF, was jubilant in the wake of the
recent G-20 Summit:
Maybe some of you were in the IMF press conference at the end of the Annual
Meeting last October. And if some of you were there, then you may remember
that what I said at that time is that IMF is back. Today you get the proof when
you read the communiqué, each paragraph, or almost each paragraph – let's
say the important ones – are in one way or another related to IMF work (IMF,
2009d).
He was right, as has been widely recognised. The return of the IMF to a central role in the
governance of global capitalism is the result of a carefully orchestrated process which has
been  going  on  behind  the  scenes  within  the  IMF  itself  and  between  the  IMF,  other
international  organisations  such  as  the  OECD  and  the  World  Bank,  and  the  UK
government in particular over the last eighteen months – sketched out at the London G20
meeting and elaborated upon at the April 2009 Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World
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Bank. These recent developments build in turn on a longer-term project, under way since
the late 1980s, aimed at promoting capitalism on a global scale – one that incidentally
bears  little  resemblance  to  the  'Washington  Consensus'  which  critics  of  the  Bretton
Woods institutions commonly denounce. 
  This paper argues that an inadequate understanding of the character of the project is
dangerous, because it leads to a fatal misinterpretation of the significance of the principal
proposals currently being put forward. Specifically, the two developments that have been
promoted and cautiously accepted by some as the most progressive – the elimination of
conditionality  in  the  IMF's  new  Flexible  Credit  Line,  and  the  plans  for  strengthened
representation of developing and emerging economies in the IMF and the World Bank –
are the most insidious. 
The Global Project
The widely accepted notion of the 'Washington Consensus' – often reduced to a formula
of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation, or the subordination of states to markets –
never captured the essential components of the development strategies promoted by the
IMF and the World Bank from the late 1980s onwards, for two reasons. First, it made no
reference to the central idea of the project – that, to quote the 1990 World Development
Report, the only route to the abolition of poverty was to “promote the productive use of
the poor's most abundant asset – labor” (World Bank, 1990: 3). The engagement of the
world's poor in productive labour (or the creation of a genuinely global proletariat) has
remained the central objective of the project ever since. Second, it gave the impression
that the project was focused exclusively on what may variously be called poor and middle
income countries,  developing  societies  or  'emerging  economies'.  Yet  in  precisely  the
same period a parallel strategy was promoted – principally by the EU and the OECD – for
2
the developed economies as a group, and the member countries of the European Union
in particular. This strategy, spelled out in the EU's 1993 White Paper on Competitiveness
and the OECD Jobs Strategy of 1994, and reflected today in the EU 'Lisbon Agenda for
Growth and Jobs' and the OECD's annual series Going for Growth, has exactly the same
focus on the need for an active state that promotes integration into the global capitalist
economy, competitive product markets, and in particular the maximisation of the number
of people in work and the productivity of their labour. The key theme running through all
of  these  proposals  is  not  privatisation,  or  liberalisation,  or  deregulation,  but
competitiveness –  the  creation of  national  environments  characterised by competitive
product and labour markets, in a global system regulated in such a way as to boost the
level of competition on a global scale (Cammack, 2006).
   Underpinning these initiatives, then, is not a project for the developing world, or the
emerging economies, or the developed world, but a universal project aimed at maximising
the level of competitiveness throughout the global capitalist economy. I characterise its
underlying objective, therefore,  as 'universal  convergence on competitiveness'.1 It  is a
global  project,  promoted principally by and through the international organisations.  Its
principal precepts, in brief, are that national governments should not be passive in the
face of the market but should maintain macro-economic stability, while directing spending
towards  social  safety  nets  and infrastructure  programmes that  favour  the  creation  of
productive jobs; that they should also provide basic programmes of health and education,
1 The Washington Consensus as described by Williamson highlighted  nine key features: fiscal discipline,
tax reform, financial liberalisation, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, free entry and
equal conditions for foreign direct investment, privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation, and
secure property rights. In contrast, the ten principal elements of the Universal Convergence on
Competitiveness are as follows: All countries must pursue competitiveness in the global economy;
country ownership is essential; international institutions are 'strategic partners in the political economy
of reform'; their task is to promote national reforms that contribute simultaneously to national and
global competitiveness; sound macro-economic policies are still the indispensable starting point;
beyond that, governments must create and maintain a good climate for investment; it must then
provide an abundant and productive labour force; public expenditure should be directed to growth-
supporting infrastructure and accelerated human capital formation; entrepreneurship and innovation
should be promoted at all levels; and there should be a particular focus on the empowerment of
women.
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while engaging the private sector extensively in financing and delivering services; that
they should support the private sector and maintain a 'good climate for investment'; and
that they should take ownership of the project, rejecting protectionism and committing to
open  goods  and  capital  markets.  At  the  same  time,  donors,  whether  international
organisations,  governments,  or  NGOs,  should  coordinate  their  activity,  and  should
increase the aid directed to these ends; and the multilateral institutions should lead the
global project. All  of these elements, spelled out years ago in the World Development
Reports of 1990 and 1991 (World Bank, 1990, 1991; Cammack, 2002), will be familiar to
anyone who has been engaged in development work or debate over the period. It  is
striking, therefore, that the 2009 Global Monitoring Report presented by the World Bank
and the IMF to the 2009 Spring Meeting, prefaced by the new mantra that “a global crisis
requires a global solution”, continues to promote exactly the same programme (Box 1).   
Box 1: Priorities for Action in the World Bank/IMF 2009 Global Monitoring Report
The report sets out six priority areas for action to confront the development emergency that
now faces many of  these countries.  First,  we must  ensure  an adequate fiscal  response in
developing  countries  to  protect  the  poor  and  vulnerable  groups  and to  support  economic
growth. Priority areas must be strengthening social safety nets and protecting infrastructure
programs that can create jobs while building a foundation for future productivity and growth.
The precise fiscal response needs to be tailored to individual country circumstances, consistent
with maintenance of macroeconomic stability. Second, we must provide support for the private
sector and improve the climate for recovery and growth in private investment, including paying
special attention to strengthening financial systems. Helping small and medium enterprises get
access to finance for trade and investment is vital  for  job creation. But  the crisis has also
underscored the importance of broader reforms to improve the stability and soundness of the
financial  system.  Third,  we  must  redouble  efforts  in  human  development  and  recover  lost
ground in progress toward the MDGs. We can do this not only by strengthening key public
programs for health and education, but also by better leveraging the private sector’s role in the
financing and delivery of services.
In support of these efforts to help developing countries, the report emphasizes three key global
priorities. Donors must deliver on their  commitments to increase aid. Indeed, the increased
needs of poor countries hit  hard by the crisis call  for going beyond existing commitments.
National governments must hold firm against  rising protectionist pressures and maintain an
open international trade and finance system. Completing the Doha negotiations expeditiously
would provide a much-needed boost in confidence to the global economy at a time of high
stress and uncertainty. Finally, multilateral institutions must have the mandate, resources, and
instruments  to  support  an  effective  global  response  to  the  global  crisis.  The  international
financial  institutions  will  need  to  play  a  key  role  in  bridging  the  large  financing  gap  for
developing countries  resulting from the slump in private capital  flows,  including using their
leverage ability to help revive private flows.
Source: World Bank, Global Monitoring Report 2009: A Development Emergency, p. xii.
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In short, far from backing off from the aim of subjecting all peoples to the disciplines of
the world market, the IFIs have seized the opportunity to advance it. Three conclusions
emerge: first, the project pursued by the international financial institutions is part of
a  broader global project addressed as much to the developed as the developing
world;  second,  its  focus is  on promoting competitiveness  at  national  and global
levels, with the emphasis upon maximising the number of people in work and the
productivity of their labour;  and third,  the IFIs have seized the opportunity of the
current crisis to press ahead with the project. The need for more effective regulation of
global financial markets has been recognised, but the objective behind it is to set the
project on a sounder footing, not to revise let alone abandon it.
'An Opportunity to Make Progress on Seemingly Intractable
Issues'
The international organisations have been united, most noticeably when the heads of the
ILO, IMF, OECD, World Bank and WTO all joined Angela Merkel in Berlin on 5 February
2009, in their conviction that this is “a global crisis [that] needs global solutions” (Presse-
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2009), and quick to put themselves forward to
provide them. IMF Executive Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and World Bank President
Robert Zoellick have been the most active both in public and behind the scenes, along
with OECD Executive Secretary Angel Gurría, the originator of the suggestion that the
international  organisations  should  position  themselves  as  “strategic  partners  in  the
political  economy of reform” (OECD, 2007: 5). In the run-up to the G-20 summit their
constant refrain was that there should be no going back on global capitalism. In this
scenario  the potential  villains  were  not  only  the  usual  suspects  –  populists  and anti-
capitalists – but also governments, whether pushed by popular protest or spurred by
hope  of  national  advantage.  The  spectre  the  international  organisations  evoked  was
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protectionism, the self-defeating beggar-my-neighbour policies identified with depression,
fascism,  and  world  war.  And  they  professed  to  hold  out  an  alternative  vision  of  “a
stronger,  cleaner  and  fairer  economy”,  in  which  “the  needs  of  poor  countries  and
vulnerable populations” would be addressed (ibid).2 
  The strategic thinking behind their campaign is spelled out clearly in an IMF document
produced in February 2009:  Initial Lessons of the Crisis for the Global Architecture and
the IMF. Its most telling passage comes in the last paragraph, which reads as follows:
Bottom line.  The crisis has revealed flaws in key dimensions of the current global
architecture,  but  also  provides  a  unique  opportunity  to  fix  them.  On  the  flaws,
surveillance needs to be reoriented to ensure warnings are clear, successfully connect
the dots, and provide practical advice to policy makers. An effective forum for policy
makers with the ability  and mandate to take leadership in responding to systemic
concerns  about  the  international  economy  is  key.  Ground  rules  for  cross-border
finance  need  to  be  strengthened.  And,  given  the  growing  size  of  international
transactions, resources available for liquidity support and easing external adjustment
should augmented and processes for  using them better  defined so they are more
readily available when needed. These are all ambitious undertakings. But the damage
wrought  by  the  crisis  provides  an  opportunity  to  make  progress  on  seemingly
intractable issues. The moment should not be missed (IMF 2009a: 13).
  For the IMF, then, the crisis represents an opportunity to perfect the 'global architecture',
by improving its powers of surveillance and policy influence and increasing the resources
behind them.  The document  begins  not  with  a  careful  consideration  of  the merits  or
otherwise of the policies promoted in recent years, but with the assertion that the traction
of  IMF surveillance (its  ability  to  persuade governments to listen to  and act  upon its
advice) needs to be improved (ibid: 1). Accepting the failure of the organisation to identify
in time the level  of  systemic risk,  it  goes on to call  for “a less fragmented and more
pointed surveillance system” (ibid:  6),  with a focus as much on the advanced as the
emerging economies. It traces a “lack of global policy coordination” to “the absence of an
2 The final point (Point 5) of the Berlin press release read: “The financial crisis and the global economic
downturn have had far-reaching effects, especially on developing countries. Against this background, it
is more important than ever that the inter-national community remain committed to its goals of
fighting poverty and promoting economic development in poorer countries, thereby resolutely
advancing the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in particular. We welcome the new
crisis-facilities launched by the World Bank Group for trade finance, infrastructure, bank
recapitalization, and microfinance and support its ongoing work to ensure that all regions of the world
can share in long-term, global prosperity.” 
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effective forum where relevant policy makers could actively engage”, and criticises the
split  between the IMF Board on the one hand, and the “purely advisory” International
Monetary  and Financial  Committee (IMFC)  of  “ministers and [Central  Bank]  governors
with  the  power  to  act”  (ibid:  7)  on  the  other.  According  to  this  analysis,  individual
governments tended to respond to the crisis with unilateral measures, rather than in a
collaborative and coordinated manner – and when the need for cooperation was finally
recognised it came, regrettably, through the “improvised” mechanism of the G-20 meeting
(November 2008), rather than through the the IMF, “the institution mandated to coordinate
efforts to preserve global financial stability” (ibid: 8). For the Fund to reclaim this role, the
Report concludes, it needs to address “deficits in ownership and effectiveness”; and the
crisis presents an opportunity:
Coordination inherently constrains the freedom of action of governments; thus it  is
understandable that they only engage in it  sparingly,  as a matter of necessity. But
crises are opportunities to overcome this resistance and progress to building more
coordination into the international  architecture.  …  Unlike alternative groupings,  the
Fund has the mandate, analytical wherewithal and institutional capacity to play this
role, but reforms are clearly needed (ibid: 8, emphasis in the original).
  It is this logic which underpins the call which follows immediately for the reform of quota
shares, and representation on the Board and the IMFC. In addition, the report proposes
“a high profile forum for focused interactive deliberations and policy follow-up” for IMFC
ministers and governors, along with other governance reforms intended to make the Fund
“a trusted actor at the center of the system” (ibid: 9).  Significantly, it  takes a low-key
approach  to  improving  cross-border  financial  regulation  (despite  its  centrality  to  the
current  crisis),  accepting  that  “a  harmonized  bank  resolution  regime  may  prove
ambitious”, and that “fundamental improvements in the institutional and legal setting –
culminating in a binding code of conduct across nations – would largely be a political task
beyond the capacities of regulators and supervisors” (ibid: 10). It turns its energy instead
to  the  case  for  increased resources  for  the  Fund.  The  issues  identified  here  are  the
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absence  of  standing  dollar  liquidity  facilities,  the  absence  of  any  large  insurance
mechanism for emerging market countries, and the stigma of fund lending: “it is no secret
that members resist approaching the Fund for financing due to the political stigma of
such borrowing” (ibid: 11):
This points to the need to tailor  the Fund's lending from general  resources to the
varying strength of members' policies and fundamentals by reforming conditionality
and to allow flexibility on access levels and repayment terms in lending instruments
that are designed to meet any type of  external  problem'.  Consideration should be
given  to  establishing  an  effective  crisis  prevention  instrument  catering  to  high-
performing  members.  For  other  members,  the  scope  for  access  to  high-access
precautionary arrangements should be clarified (ibid: 12, emphasis mine).
  It  is clear, then, that the proposal for a new crisis prevention instrument “to provide
assurances to members with a strong policy track record and sound fundamentals of
rapid, large and upfront access to Fund resources with no ex post conditionality” (ibid) is
not a waiving of conditionality, but a form of advance conditionality aimed to support and
protect already unconditional adherents to the global project. It complements the second
leg of the system, the used of strategically targeted conditionality to exploit an external
crisis to leverage desired reforms from lower-tier countries “that do not qualify for the new
instrument”. The whole scheme depends upon securing “resources commensurate to the
magnitude of the problems at issue” (ibid: 13), and the report makes that its final point,
immediately before the concluding paragraph quoted in full above (p.  6).
  Three further conclusions emerge at this point: first,  the IMF has been explicit in its
identification  of  the  crisis  as  an  opportunity  to  restore  its  influence  and  the
resources  available  to  it,  and  thereby  advance  its  global  project;  second,  the
proposed reforms to representation and conditionality are seen as essential means
to  these  ends;  and  third,  the  proposed  Flexible  Credit  Line  is  not  a  waiving  of
conditionality but a reward for unconditionality – unconditional adherence to the
global project. The Flexible Credit Line, approved by the IMF Board on 24 March, was
described as “designed to provide large and upfront  financing to members with very
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strong fundamentals and policies”, with the added comment that “as access to the FCL is
restricted to those members that meet strict qualification criteria, drawings under it are
not  tied  to  policy  goals  agreed  with  the  country”  (IMF,  2009e).  The  report  of  the
Committee on IMF Governance Reform (chaired by another 'unconditional', South Africa
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel), was published at the same time, its brief stated as being
“to come up with a broad package of reform measures that would help bring the Fund
back to the centre of the world economy” (Manuel, 2009). 
The Art of Misdirection: the G-20 Meeting (April 2009)
World Bank President Robert Zoellick ran through the emerging IFI script on 31 March,
just prior to the G-20 meeting, at Canary Wharf, at the heart of London's financial centre,
- beginning with the obligatory evocation of St. John Maynard Keynes, newly beatified as
the  patron  saint  of  global  capitalism,3 and  going  on  to  call  for  new  powers  for  the
multilaterals across the board: “a WTO monitoring system to advance trade and resist
economic  isolationism,  while  working  to  complete  the  Doha  negotiations  to  open
markets, cut subsidies, and resist backsliding”; “a monitoring role for the IMF, to review
the  execution of  ..  stimulus  packages  and assess  results,  calling  for  further  action  if
necessary”; IMF and World Bank Group monitoring of actions and results in the banking
sector, with financial sector assessments to be extended to developed countries, “with
the  results  published,  taken  seriously,  and  followed up”;  an  overhaul  of  the  financial
regulatory and supervisory system” in which “most of the actual authority over regulation
will rest with national governments”, but within which an expanded FSF “could become
another important institution of a stronger multilateral system, working with the IMF and
3 “Keynes wanted to save the market economy and feared the political consequences – in an era of
Communism and Fascism – of failing to do so.  His calls to overcome narrow interest went unheeded.
Governments reacted ineffectively to the Depression.  Countries indulged in competitive beggar-thy-
neighbor policies.  And catastrophe came.”
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the  World  Bank Group on implementation”;  and a  global  fund to  support  developing
countries,  “to  invest  in  infrastructure  projects  that  can  create  jobs  while  building  a
foundation for future productivity and growth”.4 
  Behind the scenes at the Cabinet Office, in the meantime, the emphasis in the run-up to
the G-20 Summit was equally on the need to extend the powers of surveillance of the
international organisations, led by the IMF, and to use the opportunity afforded by the
crisis and the Summit to press ahead with the promotion of competitiveness. The Final
Report  of  Working  Group 3,  set  up  in  November  to  consider  the  reform of  the  IMF,
reaffirmed the  central  role  of  the  organisation,  and called  for  the strengthening  of  its
surveillance function (G-20, 2009b: 5). The fuller Co-Chairs' Issues Paper attached to the
Report spoke of the need for an institution that “provides support to countries facing
balance of payments difficulties so that they can avoid policy responses with adverse
effects  on  other  countries”  (ibid:  13),  and  stressed the  need for  confidence-boosting
results:
To deliver  a  confidence boosting message at  the G-20 London Summit,  it  will  be
important  to  identify  and  build  consensus  around  concrete  measures  which
demonstrate, particularly in the context of the crisis, that the Fund will operate more
effectively (ibid: 14, para. 34).
This approach (known as 'quick wins' in the jargon of the political economy of reform)
reflected the central strategic goal of restoring the authority and legitimacy of the IMF. In
the same vein, the Co-Chairs' paper reflected that the IMF “does not have the power to
compel nation-states to act in accordance with the IMF Board's conclusions” (ibid: 13),
and noted both concurrent IMF consideration of the “hesitancy by some emerging market
countries to approach the Fund because of the stigma associated with a Fund program”
4 The full paragraph in which this proposal was advanced read as follows: “During the 1997-98 crisis,
China’s investments in roads, ports, airports, energy, and telecommunications supported employment
while boosting growth over the next decade.  With financial support and good governance, other
countries can do the same, building productive capacity to pay back loans.  As they do so, developing
countries will boost global demand, including for capital goods and services from developed countries.
Indeed, investments in infrastructure in developing countries probably have a greater potential to
boost productivity and growth than “bridges to nowhere” in developed economies”.
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(ibid:  20),  and  “calls  for  Fund  staff  and management  to  be more independent  in  the
conduct of surveillance and engage more directly in 'ruthless truth-telling'” (ibid: 26). 
  Here and elsewhere, the Report of Working Party 3 endorsed the parallel discussions
taking place within the IMF itself, equally envisaging a stronger IMF within which poorer
and emerging economies would feel greater ownership, and in which backsliders would
be firmly admonished while it would be made easier for star pupils in temporary difficulty
to approach the Fund for support. The parallel Final Report of Working Party 4, on the
World Bank and the Multilateral Banks, focused on the need to help low-income countries
“protect development expenditures in key areas such as health, education, nutrition and
safety nets”, while otherwise promoting the leveraging of private sector finance, including
“assisting investors from developed and emerging economies willing to invest in poorer
countries during difficult times” (G-20, 2009c: 9-10) – again explicitly endorsing the global
project outlined above.
  It was no surprise, then, that the measures announced at the end of the summit not only
made new resources available to the IMF, but also invited it to assess the actions taken
and required  to  restore  growth  (para.  10),  and  called  for  “candid,  even-handed,  and
independent IMF surveillance of our economies and financial sectors, of the impact of our
policies upon others, and of risks facing the global economy” (para. 12). As noted above,
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn could scarcely contain his glee at the
turnaround in the organisation's fortunes – indeed, he had difficulty remembering every
element in the goody bag that had fallen into his lap (IMF, 2009d). 
  However,  the  public  language  in  which  the  outcomes  were  announced  differed
substantially  from the  private  deliberations  that  had  preceded  the  summit.  The  final
communiqué  spoke  of  “the  needs  and  jobs  of  hard-working  families,  not  just  in  the
developed countries but in emerging markets and the poorest countries of the world too”,
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and held out the prospect of a “fair and sustainable world economy” (G-20, 2009a: paras
3 and 25). The emphasis was placed upon providing short-term support to prevent the
crisis  from  wreaking  havoc  on  poor  and  emerging  economies.  Gordon  Brown  went
further, and announced in his closing press conference that
The old Washington consensus is over.  Today we have reached a new consensus -
that we take global action together to deal with the problems we face; that we will do
what is necessary to restore growth and jobs; that we will  take essential action to
rebuild confidence and trust in our financial system, and to prevent a crisis such as
this ever happening again (Brown, 2009).
Quite what Brown (or his speech-writers) understood by this claim is open to speculation.
But it was part of a concerted effort to portray the summit outcomes as a break with a
neoliberal past and an act of benevolence towards the poor and the developing world,
while  less  widely  circulated  briefings  addressed  to  the  global  policy  community
highlighted the new role envisaged for the IFIs (Ishwaran, 2009).
  According to some commentators, the Summit did little to address the crisis (Bretton
Woods Project, 2009; Financial Times, 2009; Giles, 2009; Landler, 2009, Munchau, 2009;
Wall Street Journal, 2009). And indeed, the gathered leaders failed to agree a new fiscal
stimulus to boost global demand, or to restart the stalled Doha trade round. They did
nothing  about  the  mass  of  worthless  assets  dispersed  through  the  global  financial
system, nothing of consequence to impose new regulations on the financial sector, and
nothing to reverse the old and new protectionism across the developed and developing
world. 
  Did nothing much happen, then? On the contrary, what was pulled off at the Summit
was a  stunningly  successful  illusion  –  a  classic  piece of  misdirection  (the  magician's
practice of directing attention away from the key moves upon which the surreptitious
achievement  of  the  desired  outcome depends)  which  affected  to  signal  a  change of
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course  and  offer  relief  to  poor  and  emerging  economies,  but  in  fact  confirmed  and
reinforced the ruthless logic of capitalist competitiveness on a global scale.5 
  At this point, then, three further conclusions impose themselves. First, the IMF and the
World  Bank  succeeded,  perhaps  beyond  their  expectations,  in  imposing  their
agenda on the G-20 Summit; second, they did so, in large measure, because of the
support  they  received  from  Gordon  Brown  and  the  Cabinet  Office,  who  acted
consistently to further the IFI  project;  third,  in  part  by trading on the misleading
notion of the 'Washington Consensus', the protagonists were able to pass off the
intensification of their neoliberal global project as a break with it. And as with all
successful  illusions, this one benefited from the planting of willing accomplices in the
audience – in this case, three Mexican stooges.
The Three (Mexican) Stooges
According to an online Magicians Dictionary, a stooge is an 'audience member who is
actually  planted  as  part  of  the  act  and  who  acts  in  a  cooperative  manner  with  the
magician'  (http://www.glossarycentral.com/magic/stooge.html).  There  were  three  such
stooges  at  the  G-20  Summit,  Mexico's  President,  Felipe  Calderón,  Finance  Minister,
Agustín  Carstens,  and Central  Bank Governor  Guillermo Ortiz  Martinez.   They  had a
history.  Calderón  had  hosted  World  Bank  President  Robert  Zoellick,  IMF  Managing
Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Interamerican Development Bank President Luis
Alberto Moreno at the First Meeting of Latin American and Caribbean Finance Ministers in
Cancún in June 2008. He used the occasion to parade his credentials as an IMF-World
5 The logic of enforcement of a politics of global competitiveness was apparent in advice addressed to
the G-20 in a volume produced jointly by the Atlantic Council and the Royal Institute for International
Affairs (Chatham House): “The IMF (helped by the World Bank and OECD) needs to re-engage in
structural issues. Countries with looming pension or health-care imbalances, barriers to productivity
growth and competitiveness, and poor environments for doing business need to come up with concrete
commitments to change. The IMF is not equipped to do this on its own. Rather, crisis teams including
the World Bank and OECD will need to work off the example of collaboration on Financial Sector
Assessment Programmes to construct structural recovery programmes” (Schadler, 2009: 42).
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Bank  poster  child,  and  to  call  for  increased  powers  for  the  international  financial
organisations.6 Ortiz  was  a  former  Mexican  ambassador  to  the  IMF;  and  Carstens,
present in Cancún as well as at the G-20 Summit, was Deputy Managing Director of the
IMF,  no  less,  from  2003-2006  before  he  left  to  join  Calderón's  campaign  team  and
government,  and  the  current chair  of  the  influential  IMF-World  Bank  Development
Committee which produced the report cited on p. 4 above. Echoing Gurría's view of the
OECD as  a  strategic  partner  of  decision-makers  in  the  political  economy  of  reform',
Carstens, while in office as IMF Deputy Managing Director, had described the Fund as
“charged with helping countries to take difficult decisions in the macroeconomic arena”
(Carstens, 2004). He now played his part in a carefully prepared coup de théâtre: the
announcement that Mexico would be the first country to sign up to the IMF's new Flexible
Credit Line. And, word-perfect with the new script, he celebrated the agreement as an
endorsement of the soundness of Mexico's economy and its policy stance, turning  the
idea of a 'stigma' attached to recourse to the IMF on its head.7
  One final conclusion: at the heart of the G-20 meeting was a painstakingly mounted
and  breathtakingly  audacious  illusion,  and  the  carefully  rehearsed  and  scripted
introduction  of  the  Flexible  Credit  Line,  with  a  team  of  unconditional  Mexican
supporters of the IMF and its policies primed to volunteer for it, put the finishing
touch to it. And the lesson? The servants of global capital are not to be underestimated.
6 “Nuestros países enfrentan el reto de remover los obstáculos que frenan el crecimiento y la competitividad.
Por eso en  México estamos impulsando reformas estructurales que fortalecen los cimientos de nuestro desarrollo a
futuro. … Para cumplir con los objetivos comunes de nuestra agenda, de crecimiento económico con justicia, los
organismos financieros internacionales tienen un importante papel que jugar como aliados que puedan proporcionar
asesoría valiosa, financiamiento y liderazgo, precisamente al abordar esos problemas. Mas allá de la indispensable
reforma de las instituciones globales, es fundamental que éstas sean capaces de articular en el presente un mayor
liderazgo ante las nuevas circunstancias de la economía mundial” (Calderón, 2008). See also Herrera Beltrán and
Gonzalez Amador, 2008.
7 As Carstens told Mexican journalists in London: “México fue considerado para esta línea de crédito, porque se
caracteriza por un manejo de política económica sólida y cuenta con una estructura económica en las mismas
condiciones. Destacó que esta es la primera vez que el Fondo Monetario Internacional ofrece cerca de 50 mil
milliones de dólares sin condicionalidad, lo que representa que es 'un tributo' a la fortaleza de la economía
mexicana” (El Mañana, 2009).
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Breaking the Code
To see through the illusion that threatens to restore and perpetuate the power of global
capital, one needs to break the multilaterals' code – or to locate their current proposals
within the broader project, under way for two decades, to force the pace of development
of capitalism on a global scale. Its logic of 'universal convergence on competitiveness'
differs from the Washington Consensus not because it has replaced it, but because the
Washington  Consensus  was  a  partial  synthesis  that  did  not  capture  the  strategy
espoused by the World Bank, the EBRD, the EU and the OECD in the early 1990s – one
that took the macro-economic discipline promoted by the IMF as an essential starting-
point, but went beyond it to insist on the need for micro-structural reform in product and
labour markets, along with widespread changes in taxation and welfare policies, in order
to prompt the structural and behavioural changes in the developed and developing world
that would embed the disciplines of capitalist competitiveness everywhere. 
  Wherever one looks, then, one finds a consistent perspective aimed at furthering the
development  of  capitalism  on  a  global  scale.  Fundamental  to  this  project  was  the
revamping of the international organisations, in order to enhance their disciplinary power.
The  international  organisations  in  focus  here  have  long  been  committed  to  a  global
perspective whose logic is the promotion of forms of competitiveness at national level
which  simultaneously  enhance  competitiveness  in  the  global  capitalist  economy.  The
objective  is  that  the  disciplines  of  capitalist  competitiveness,  actively  promoted  and
superintended by states, should be introduced and deeply embedded on a global scale.
They  have  struggled  to  assert  themselves,  but  their  project  has  been  substantially
furthered by their concerted response to the current crisis. The slogan around which they
have united – All Power to Global Capital – points the way clearly to the terms on which
opposition must be mounted.
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Further Reading
I have not burdened the text or the argument here with excessive references to theoretical
sources. But for those interested, I would recommend Braunmühl (1978), Burnham (1994)
and Holloway (1994), along with Cammack (2002, 2003, 2006) for my own approach.  
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